NETWORK SERVICES
LIBERALISATION, COMPETITION
AND LABOUR MARKET
GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF GREEK
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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Network Services Liberalisation, Competition and Labour Market Governance: The Case of Greek Telecommunications

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Abstract: The paper traces the process of change in the regulation and associational governance of the labour market of the Greek telecommunications industry during the past two decades. The industry has been shaped by the EU regulatory impact, which prompted the opening up of the market to competition. The competitive pressures, in conjunction with the privatization process of the incumbent operator, brought about new structures of interest representation in labour and business. The paper considers these developments in the context of theoretical conjectures about convergence and divergence in the labour relations sphere of capitalist models. It is argued that the path of convergence to the Anglo-Saxon model of decentralised bargaining is largely explained by the form of interest representation of business, and the divisions between and within labour.

Keywords: Associational Governance; Labour Relations; Liberalisation; Telecommunications; Varieties of Capitalism.

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I. Introduction

One of the central questions in the comparative political economy literature has been whether cross-national institutions are becoming more similar over time. This process has been typically understood as "convergence" (Jacoby, 2005; Mueller, 1994) to the Anglo-Saxon or Liberal Market model of capitalism. The institutional arrangements in this model of capitalism are usually exemplified either by the United Kingdom or the United States (King & Wood, 1999; Rubery, 1994; Whitley, 2009). The pressures for institutional convergence were associated with wider processes of globalization. These include the spread of multinational capital and the diffusion of liberal principles in the organisation of markets. Indeed, some scholars differentiated the processes between "mimetic" and "coercive" processes of convergence (Mills et al., 2008). On the one side, the multinational companies (MNCs) that are committed to a shareholder-value model of corporate governance are held responsible for the diffusion of "best practice" strategies across institutional contexts (Dore, 2002). On the other side, the coercive convergence pressures typically came from the effects of supranational regulation pushing for trade liberalization and leading to intensified competition (Scharpf, 2003; Strange, 1997).

Against this background of increasing pressures for convergence, neo-institutionalist theorists suggested that cross-national diversity persists, with domestic actors and path-dependence mediating the pressures from globalisation and liberalisation (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007; Morgan, Whitley, & Moen, 2006). To overcome the limitations of earlier conjectures, they proposed to focus on social agency, and especially the role of actors and their coalitions (Crouch, 2005; Hall & Thelen, 2009), as the most fruitful avenue to uncover the mechanisms of institutional change across diverse socio-economic contexts.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the trajectory of change in a case of a highly internationalised industry. The telecoms industry has undergone substantial change in recent decades, due to technological advances, but also due to the opening up of closed markets in the context of the European Union (EU). The paper will examine the impact of the changes in the EU regulatory framework, on the competitive pressures in the market, and their interplay with the evolution of the "associational governance" of the labour market (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985). Typically, the governance of the labour market involves an institution of wage bargaining that is established between trade unions and employers associations. In line with coalitional approaches to institutional change, the paper will attempt to uncover the interactions between relevant social actors, and how their coalitions and strategies influence the path of change.

The empirical focus is on the case of the Greek telecommunications sector. This is an instance of an industry in which the Anglo-Saxon model of decentralised bargaining became the norm. After the full liberalisation there was an effort to centralise bargaining, however, it was marked by a failure. This presents us with an intriguing empirical puzzle. The aim of this paper is to account for this failure of centralisation, explaining it by reference to the structures of interest representation of business and labour.

The paper unfolds in the following way. The next section presents the research design of the case study. Then I give a brief overview of the European Union regulatory impact across national telecommunications industries. Next, the focus shifts towards the main empirical case study. I provide a historical perspective of the sweeping structural changes that are observed in the Greek telecoms since the 1980s, including the gradual liberalisation of the market, the process of privatisation of OTE, and more generally the intensification of competition. The case study also considers the changes observed in the representation of labour and business that explain the main empirical puzzle. The final sections discuss the findings of the case study and conclude with the implication for wider literature.
II. Research Design

The paper suggests the plausibility of the argument with a case study of the Greek telecommunications sector. The wider institutional context in Greece belongs to the Mediterranean model of capitalism (Amable, 2003), with traditions of extensive state ownership in the economy, heavy employment regulation and state involvement in the labour relations realm. The particular sector was chosen because it is a highly internationalised one, which was under the influence of EU supranational regulation. After the entry of MNCs in the sector (e.g. Vodafone) competition intensified, and the privatisation process (eventually OTE was acquired by Deutsche Telekom) accelerated the diffusion of flexible management practices. Thus, the pressures for destabilisation appeared strong and the sector represents a "critical case" (George & Bennett, 2005) for convergence to decentralised bargaining structures. Indeed, before the opening up of the sector, firm-level wage bargaining coincided with sectoral-level wage bargaining (i.e. the monopoly telecoms operator was in fact the whole sector). Still, there was an effort to centralise wage bargaining at the post-liberalisation stage and this presents us with an empirical puzzle. The research question that the paper will answer is: why did the centralisation of bargaining fail, despite the fact that it was desirable by the union side?

The data for the case study were collected via interviews with key informants. Elite interviewing was chosen as the most appropriate data collection method to uncover the path of change via "process tracing" (George & Bennett, 2005; Hall, 2006). The key informants included representatives from industry and national trade union organisations, representatives from industry business associations, representatives of government, as well as experts. The fieldwork was carried out in Athens (February 2010 and July 2010). The typical length of interviews was about one hour, the interview instrument was a semi-structured questionnaire, and most interviews were tape-recorded. The case studies also rely on several sources including inter alia: press releases and official announcements, wage bargaining agreements, newspaper articles, and expert reports.
III. The Liberalisation of European Telecommunications

The liberalisation programme in European telecommunications was influenced by two concurrent transnational developments: technological advances and overseas reforms (Thatcher, 2007a). On the one hand, technological change greatly accelerated over the 1980s and 1990s, allowed the application of computing (e.g., the digitisation of switching and transmission), new methods of transmission (e.g. optical fibre cables and satellites) for quicker, cheaper telephony and provision of new value added services (Humphreys & Simpson, 2008:851; Thatcher, 2004:765). On the other hand, overseas reforms during the 1970s and early 1980s altered the traditional conception that telecommunications were a "natural monopoly".

The first mover was the United States, with a speedily reformed telecommunications market. Initially, AT&T’s monopoly was abolished and new entrants emerged (e.g., MCI and Sprint). AT&T was finally broken up in 1984 into seven “baby Bells” (Ramirez, Guy, & Beale, 2007:500). Similarly, the monopoly of British Telecom in Britain ended in 1984, after the Conservative government gave to Mercury a 25 year licence as a public operator (Thatcher, 2007a:169).

The reforms in the US and Britain unleashed a global dynamic of international "regulatory competition" and "competitive emulation", and the Continental Europeans became persuaded that liberalisation was unavoidable if they were to retain their international competitiveness (Humphreys & Simpson, 2008:851). After overcoming disagreements between member-states in the late 1980s (Schneider, 2001), the European Commission accelerated the implementation of its liberalisation agenda particularly targeted to dissolving national telecom monopolies. A series of Commission Directives required their gradual abolition within a finite deadline on the 1st of January 1998 (Table 1).
Table 1: The European Regulatory Impact on Telecommunications 1983-1996.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Directive/Regulation</th>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Commission outlines strategies for a common telecommunications policy. Establishment of expert group SOGT.</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>Council recommendation on harmonisation in the field of telecommunications.</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Council directive on mutual recognition of terminal equipment.</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>Green Paper on the Common Market for telecommunications services and equipment</td>
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<td>1988</td>
<td>Commission Directive on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Council decision to gradually liberalize telecommunication with the exception of telephony and public infrastructures</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Commission Directive on telecommunications services liberalizing all services with the exception of telephony, mobiles and satellite communications. Council Directive on Open Network Provision requiring the separation of operating and regulating functions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Council Decision to open all telecommunications services to competition as of 1.1.98</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Commission Directive liberalizing the use of alternative infrastructures as of 1.7.96</td>
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Source: Schneider (2001:64).

The opening up of the market was gradual, first targeting specific segments such as satellite communications and mobile telephony, until the whole range of telecommunications services was fully liberalised. As a consequence of the European liberalisation programme, dozens of incumbents telecom operators rapidly transformed into world class multinational corporations (Clifton, Díaz-Fuentes, & Revuelta, 2010:988). The process of domestic liberalisation triggered a strategy of internationalisation of several of the incumbent telecoms operators. In that process, the previously bureaucratic organisations were quickly transformed into internationally competitive firms, which adopted flexible management practices.

The resultant re-regulation in a wide range of "network services" sectors is partly reflected on an OECD indicator, which measures product market regulation of non-manufacturing industries (Table 2).
Again there are variable paces in the liberalisation path across European countries. However, the reduction of regulatory strictness is observed across the board. Again the UK is at the forefront, having the least regulation of network industries, with Germany having the second lowest regulation. On the other hand Greece and Ireland have also reduced the levels of product market regulation, but to a lesser extent than other countries.

### Table 2: Product Market Regulation on Non-manufacturing Sectors (telecoms, electricity, etc), EU15, 1990-2007.

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IV. Institutional Change in the Greek Telecommunications Sector

1) Greek Telecoms until the 1980s: Monopoly and State Ownership

Until 1949, telephony services in Greece were provided by AETE (Greek Telephone Company), which was a Siemens subsidiary. A subsidiary of the British Cable & Wireless (Eastern Telegraph) and the post-office (Tachidromia Tilegrafia Telefona-TTT) shared the international telegraphy.\(^1\) After the end of World War II, the national communications infrastructure was largely destroyed, and the cost of repairs was borne out by the US Marshall Plan funds. As a result, the Greek government decided to nationalise the above companies, merging them into a single one: the Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE), keeping separate the post office. With Law 1049/1949 the state granted OTE with the monopoly in telecommunications services that involved "the exclusive right to administer and exploit all telecommunication media on wire and radio transmission, local trunk, national and international communications" (Constantelou, 1993:435).

In the following decades, the performance of the incumbent telecommunications operator was ambivalent. On the one side, it started from a very low telephone density, but managed to attain very high rates by the end of the 1950s: 2.88 telephone connections per 100 inhabitants, which was the 10\(^{th}\) highest rate in Europe.\(^2\) Additionally, OTE was among the first European operators to automate the intercity telephone calls in the 1960s, and was the 6\(^{th}\) in Europe to launch an antenna of satellite communications in 1970. The above achievements were due to a rapid expansion of its network and substantial infrastructure investments.

On the other side, customer demand was never fully met and customer service quality deteriorated as demand for new telephone connections increased over time.\(^3\) Indicatively, by the end of the 1980s the waiting time for a new telephone line installation was about 5.5 years (Michalis, 1994:447). The inefficient performance of OTE was exacerbated by the prevalence of clientelistic practices. It was not an
unusual phenomenon to recruit personnel on the basis of political affiliation criteria, catering for electoral interests of successive centre-right and socialist governments (Constantelou, 1993:437; Michalis, 1994:443). This led to overstaffing in OTE reaching a peak of employment at about 30,000 employees in 1986 (Doukas, 2009). Even more, the management of the organisation suffered from excessive government interference. For instance, equipment procurement had to be approved by special government committees in the Ministry of Telecommunications, while the tariff policy was co-determined with the Ministry of Economy, which sought to keep costs for consumers low (Constantelou, 1993:437).

It is important to mention that during the 1980s the telecommunications sector (along with others such as electricity and transport) was a target of the socialist government’s "socialisation policy". Socialisation was one of the main programmatic aims of the PASOK party under Andreas Papandreou, when he came into power in 1981. The scheme’s rationale entailed "introducing elements of social control, decentralisation, and democratic planning" (Lyberaki & Tsakalotos, 2002:103) in public sector enterprises which produced some sort of public good. Thus, "social control" of those enterprises was expected to be achieved via employee participation in management, and eventually promote economic development. The scheme was introduced with Law 1365/1983, but -as with many other laws- its actual implementation was delayed. The plan was to change the organisational structure of public sectors enterprises, introducing a new body called Representative Assembly of Social Control. The latter consisted of representatives from a variety of stakeholders such as the state, local government, consumer organisations, and the trade unions, and was charged with charting the medium-term and long-term planning in companies of public interest. As Lyberaki and Tsakalotos (2002) note the ASKE sought to promote greater transparency and efficiency, but fell victim of clientelistic practices and was never fully implemented. By the end of the 2000s ASKE and the right of unions to be represented in the board of directors were abolished (Zambarloukou, 2010:244).

Similarly to other EU telecommunications sectors (Thatcher, 2004, 2007a), the changes in the sector were influenced from developments at the European Union level in the late 1980s. The Commission’s plans to gradually open up European
telecommunications prompted the specification of a five-year development plan (1989-1993) for OTE. The overall aim of the plan was to modernise the existing infrastructure and radically improve provision of services along specific targets: (i) higher telephone density per 100 inhabitants; (ii) reduction in waiting list for outstanding applications and zeroing the waiting list for business applications (iii) reduction of waiting time for residential applications to a few months and 1 month for businesses (iv) increase the digitisation of existing infrastructure (Constantelou, 1993:436). To assist the aim of modernisation, the European Commission, with the agreement of the Greek government, requested from the UK based management consultancy, Coopers, Lybrand & Deloitte, to conduct a study on the reform of the telecommunications market (Michalis, 1994). This EU impetus for liberalisation was destined to radically transform the Greek telecommunications industry.

2) Greek Telecoms in the 1990s: State Withdrawal and the Market Unbound

The liberalisation of telecommunications in Greece started with the separation of telecoms operation and regulation. In 1992, the centre-right government under Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis passed Law 2075/1992 to establish the first independent regulator, the National Telecommunications Commission (EET). Its actual operation was delayed until the summer of 1995, and even then it was still focused only on the mobile telephony segment of the market. Law 2668/1998 of the socialist government under Prime Minister Kostas Simitis reorganised the postal services sector, and as a result, the authority was renamed into National Telecommunications and Post Commission (henceforth: EETT) and entrusted with the supervision and regulation of both sectors. The regulatory framework was subsequently revised and streamlined with European Union Directives, first with Law 2867/2000, which enhanced the supervisory, auditing and regulatory powers of EETT; and later with Law 3431/2006 which further specified the institutional framework of electronic communications and networks (Internet).

The early 1990s also mark the first attempt to privatise the national telecoms company (OTE). The procedure that was favoured by the right-wing Mitsotakis government
was a mix of asset sale and share issue privatisation. It was planned that the 35 per cent of ownership of OTE would be sold to a strategic investor via auction; 10 per cent would be sold to the public via issuing shares; and another 4 per cent was earmarked for OTE employees. The Minister of Economy at the time, Stefanos Manos, sent out an information sheet with a call for tenders. Several global players expressed interest, such as: Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT), Telefonica, and France Telecom. Despite the interest, the plan to privatise OTE backfired on the government. It met fierce resistance not only from the socialist opposition under Andreas Papandreou and the socialist dominated trade union of OTE (Dimas, 2010:19-24), but also from prominent members of the New Democracy party, such as the late Miltiadis Evert, who later succeeded Mitsotakis as a leader of the party. The slim parliamentary majority of the Mitsotakis government was lost and the government collapsed in 1993.

Following the October 1993 elections, the new socialist government under Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, abandoned the plans for finding a strategic investor for OTE. However, the PASOK government did not fully forsake the plans for privatisation. Fiscal consolidation for the entry to the Economic and Monetary Union was considered as completely unattainable without -at least partial- privatisations (Dimas, 2010:26; Pagoulatos, 2005:360; Pagoulatos & Zahariadis, 2011:3). OTE was one of the gems in the crown of public sector companies, and certainly, on the top of the privatisation list.

Yet, the socialists followed a much different approach for the privatisation of OTE than the earlier centre-right government. Instead of asset-sale privatisation (transferring a block of shares to a strategic investor) the government pursued a more "gradualist" approach of shares issuing. Indeed, the initial public offering of OTE stocks (8 per cent value) took place in 1996 under the socialist Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, who succeeded the late Andreas Papandreou. It is important to note that the privatisation was already underway under PM Papandreou, however, vacillations over the legal framework specifying the procedure, delayed the first offering. The socialist government until 2004, when the state owned 33 per cent of the organisation, followed this gradualist approach. The "gradualist" approach in privatisation ended
with the acquisition of majority ownership by Deutsche Telekom in 2008 under New Democracy. The next table documents this gradual reduction in the government’s ownership of OTE.

Table 3: Government Ownership (%) of OTE, 1993 - 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government’s Stake</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>The government enacts Law 2257/1994 setting the minimum government stake at 75 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>Public Offering of OTE shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>Public Offering of OTE shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>The government enacts Law 2731/1998 setting minimum government stake at 51 per cent. Public Offering of OTE shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>The government enacts Law 2843/2000 setting minimum government stake at 33.3 per cent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>Public Offering of OTE shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>The Government’s stake increases temporarily to 48.6 per cent, because it exercises an option to convert a bond into shares. This is followed by public offering of OTE shares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>The government enacts Law 3522/2006 which abolished the requirement for a minimum government stake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>The government sells another 10 per cent to institutional investors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom acquires 20 per cent of OTE from Marfin Investment Group, 3 per cent from the government, and 2 per cent from the Athens Stock Exchange.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom acquires another 5 per cent of OTE from the government and becomes the larger shareholder.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OME-OTE (nd) "The chronology of OTE privatisation" Unpublished Manuscript.

Despite the failure of the Mitsotakis government to privatise OTE, it still managed to achieve one part of its government agenda for telecommunications industry: open up the mobile telephony segment. On 5 August 1992 there was an auctioning of 2 GSM licences. OTE was excluded from the procurement process with the rationale that the market was not "large enough" to allow for a third player, while it was claimed that two private companies would ensure competition and efficiency.\(^6\)
As a result, competition in the Greek mobile telephony started with a duopoly between a consortium led by Vodafone (Panafon) and a consortium led by Telecom Italia (Telestet), later acquired by WIND. After the change of government to the socialist party in 1993, the incumbent operator OTE was allowed to enter the mobile telephony, and in April 1998 it launched its own subsidiary, Cosmote using the much more expensive DCS 1800 system. Although Vodafone started as the leader in the mobile market, Cosmote soon surpassed both competitors, and by June 2001, it had the highest share of subscribers. This was accomplished with a very aggressive product market strategy that entailed "price wars" and product diversification via launching new services. The radically changing market shares between the leader and the followers in the market are presented in the following table with UK as a comparison. UK is chosen as a yardstick of a very competitive market, since it was liberalised earlier than any other in Europe.

Table 4: Market Shares (based on subscribers) in Mobile Telephony across Greece and the UK, 2000 – 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading operator</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main competitor</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+Other competitors</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading operator</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main competitor</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third+Other competitors</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Intensification of competition took also place in the fixed-telephony segment of the market, albeit with a notable delay. While most of the European Union member states were obliged to open up their markets by 1st January 1998, the Greek government managed to negotiate with the European Commission a three-year extension, so that full liberalisation would take place in 2001. In those three years, OTE was expected to modernise and prepare for an environment with high competitive pressures, while the necessary institutional framework would be set. In the years that followed 2001, the independent regulator authority assumed a more active role, making sure that OTE does not take advantage of its dominant position. Thus, new entrants were allowed to
compete with OTE (and with each other) offering services using the "last mile" of the network of OTE. As we shall see in a later section, these policies stirred a continuous conflict between OTE and the independent regulator, in which the OME-OTE union was involved (see below).^8

One of the major players, which entered the fixed telephony market in the early 2000s, was the Greek public electricity company (DEH) in a consortium with Italian WIND and formed the "Tellas" company. Additionally, two major Internet service providers ("Forthnet" and "Hellas On Line") took advantage of their network infrastructure to offer fixed telephony services. The new entrants included also several new start-up companies (e.g. Lannet, Telepassport, Teledome, Altec Telecoms, and Vivodi). However, few of them manage to survive the intensity of competition, and by the late 2000s many were either acquired by larger players or were closed down.9

The regulatory impact of EETT afforded the new players to erode OTE’s monopoly position. As part of its policy to inject competition in the market, EETT took a number of measures, for example, introducing number portability to allow easy switching between providers. Additionally, the regulatory frame became stricter, when EETT made a significant reduction in OTE’s wholesale charges and prohibited OTE from charging consumers (retail price) below a certain threshold. From EETT’s standpoint, the policy sought to prevent OTE from applying price squeeze upon its competitors (Pagoulatos & Zahariadis, 2011:18) and OTE suffered a steady decline in market share. The following table documents this fall in market shares and compares Greece with UK, again, as a benchmark of a very competitive market.

Table 5: Incumbent Telecom Operator’s Market Share (by retail revenue) in Fixed Telephony across Greece and the UK, 1997 - 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EL (OTE)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (BT)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general strategy that was followed by OTE during the socialist governments’ rule (1993-2004) was akin to that of building a "national champion". OTE’s role in the Balkan telecommunications market was similar to that of National Bank of Greece in the Balkan banking sector and both firms led the corporate expansion to the emerging markets of Southeastern Europe. Indeed, OTE (either directly, or indirectly via Cosmote) expanded in the neighbouring markets via setting up subsidiaries or acquiring stakes in existing firms. This expansion was either in mobile or fixed telephony segments. While this expansive strategy enhanced the position of OTE as a major player in the region, however, it did run out of steam. As Pagoulatos and Zahariadis (2011:5) argue:

...underinvestment threatened OTE’s ability to catch up with the next big technological waves, such as broadband telephony. Thus, the “national champion” regionalisation strategy gave way to internationalisation through entry of and transfer of management to a major foreign strategic partner.

When the government changed to the centre-right in 2004 under Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, the state had a minority ownership, which was standing at 33 per cent. The new government tried to find a major telecoms player to acquire OTE, however, it was unsuccessful. Therefore, it followed the "gradualist" approach of share-issue privatisation, selling another 10.7 per cent of issues to institutional investors. The next year, it hired an international consultant consortium to look for a strategic investor again; however, this search did not yield any results. While OTE’s presence in the Balkans was impressive, there were three elements that made the acquisition of OTE unattractive: (i) OTE was overstaffed; (ii) the employees enjoyed a job-for-life tenure by law; and (iii) the rights of minority shareholders were not strong enough. The government sought to act on all three terrains to proceed with its privatisation agenda. During August 2007, just one month before the elections, the government amended Law 2190 on corporate governance, strengthening the minority shareholder rights and abolition of the limit of 33 per cent for the government stake in OTE.
This change had unintended consequences, obviously not foreseen by the government. The combination of this institutional reform with a high exposure of OTE shares in the stock market, made OTE vulnerable to a hostile takeover. This opportunity was seized by Marfin Investment Group (MIG), a holdings company with investments in several sectors. MIG started silently buying out OTE shares from the stock market, reaching gradually a 19.9 per cent of OTE. The revelation of this slow acquisition led to a public outcry for the government, which was blamed for "being caught while sleeping".

Marfin Investment Group requested a seat in the board of directors and expressed the interest in taking over management of the firm from the government. Moreover, it publicly assured employees and the government that its intention was to make a long-term investment and develop OTE as a national champion, rather than liquidate it or sell off parts. However, the government did not favour such an acquisition. To avoid this hostile takeover, the Minister of Economy, George Alogoskoufis, passed quickly a bill through which set a 20 per cent limit for the participation of individual investors in companies of "strategic importance" such as OTE. It was clear that this bill was against European competition rules, and would be challenged by the European Commission. In practice, this bought some time for the government to find a "white knight" and achieve a friendly takeover.

The Greek government wanted the very same German firm to be the buyer of OTE, considering Marfin Investment Group’s interest as highly opportunistic. After consultations between government, Deutsche Telekom, and MIG, a deal was arranged so that DT buys MIG’s shares at a mutually convenient price and another 5 per cent from the government. DT agreed under the condition that it would eventually purchase an additional 5 per cent from the government, which would give a total of 30 per cent ownership. This made DT "the largest shareholder with rights to appoint the Chief Executive and to have a majority of seats on the company’s board". In 2009 the takeover of OTE by Deutsche Telekom was finalised.
3) The Representation of Labour: Divided Unions and Organisational Fragmentation

OME-OTE was a trade union federation, which was established in 1982 and had as affiliate members "occupational" unions operating in OTE divisions. Although OME-OTE appears as a unitary trade union representing OTE employees, there are several internal divisions that play out inside the organisation: (i) between employees with different skills and qualifications (secondary vs. higher education); (ii) between white collar sales staff and blue collar technicians and engineers; and (iii) between union federations affiliated with different political parties. Except for the Cosmote union, none of the other affiliate unions had the right to negotiate or sign wage agreements. Instead, the preparation of each bargaining round was as follows: OME-OTE federation called the representatives of the primary occupational unions to submit the demands for the employees they represent. This usually involved wage-related and non-wage (institutional) issues, and from this process the federation derived its overall bargaining platform to be used during negotiations.

Union factionalism along ideological lines was present in OME-OTE in line with the general structure of trade unionism in Greece. However, it is important to note that OME-OTE has been a stronghold of the PASKE faction associated with the socialist party. The faction associated with the centre-right New Democracy party comes second in power. The two factions combined have a strong grasp over the OME-OTE union, since they possess 10 out of 13 seats in the Executive Committee and 17 out of 22 seats in the Administrative Board. Reflecting this balance of power, the president of OME-OTE is customarily from the socialist PASKE, while the general secretary from centre-right DAKE.

While OME-OTE is a federation and could – in principle – accept other unions as members, in practice it remained very much introvert, focused on representing OTE Group employees. As we shall see below, this "exclusivist" strategy was an important factor accounting for the failure of unions to speak with a single voice. Although the OME-OTE federation amended its statute so that it is able to accept other organisations as members, however, its eligibility requirements remained so strict,
which in practice excluded the new smaller unions in the sector. The only new affiliate member that it accepted after the liberalisation of the sector was the union established in its Cosmote subsidiary. The Cosmote union was established in 2000, after an initiative from employees to exercise their rights to associate. In 2002 the union managed to agree General Staff Regulations with Cosmote management. As with other firms in the sector, flexibility was pervasive, since it relied heavily on outsourcing and subcontractors. Employees were working for Cosmote, but their employment relationship lied with some other company. The Cosmote union managed to minimize the extent of outsourcing for its own employees. Additionally, it signed its first firm-level agreement in 2004 and then another two agreements in 2006 and 2008. In the process, the union benefited from its affiliation with OME-OTE, the federal union of the parent company.

Employees in the new telecoms firms lacked the opportunity to benefit from OME-OTE representation, because OME-OTE required from a union to have at least 500 members in order to become an affiliate. In fact no other union in the sector satisfies this requirement, and the gap of workers’ representation in the new firms was filled "bottom-up" with grass-roots radical unionisation. In 2005 a group of employees managed to set up a firm level union in WIND (PASE-TIM/WIND: Pan-Hellenic Union of TIM/WIND Employees), and subsequently unions were established in mobile telephony Vodafone (PASE-Vodafone - Pan-Hellenic Union of Vodafone Employees) as well as in fixed telephony company Forthnet. Firm level agreements were eventually agreed in Wind and Vodafone, usually under the reluctant acceptance from the firms’ management, which generally followed an anti-union stance. In their effort to establish firm level unions, grass-roots organisers conducted field visits to workplaces across Greece. The organisers in WIND were aided more from the Athens Labour centre (Ergatiko Kentro Athinas) the Federation of Private Employees (OYIE) and SMT rather than OME-OTE. However, these unions did not develop internal political factions, because they thought that this would deter potential members, and preferred to be autonomous and focus on workplace issues.

Finally, there are two other smaller unions that are more sectoral in perspective, rather company-based: the SMT (Union of Waged Technicians) and the Athens-based
SETIP (Union of Workers in Telecommunications and Informatics). SMT was an occupational union whose members were employed on spurious self-employment contracts (blokaki) in the informatics and telecoms sector or were unemployed technicians and engineers. SETIP was disconnected from other unions, since it was controlled by the communist party (KKE).

This organisational fragmentation might lead one to the conclusion that any effort for coordinated action on the part of unions was a priori destined to fail. However, organisational fragmentation per se is not a hindrance for coordinated action. Instead, if traditional unions had followed an inclusive strategy, they might have been able to temper the radicalisation of employees in new firms, and unite them under a single banner. The table below summarises the representation of employees in the sector and the next section turns to the side of business representation.
Table 6: Main Trade Union Organisations in the Greek Telecoms Sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function/Affiliation</th>
<th>Membership/Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Employees of OTE (OME-OTE)</td>
<td>Represents all employees in OTE with permanent employment relationship; Negotiates firm level agreements; Affiliated with peak-level tertiary union GSEE</td>
<td>Members: 6 primary (occupational) Unions; Union factions: PASKE; DAKE; AS; ESK; ASE; AKOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union of Waged Technicians (SMT)</td>
<td>Represents spurious self-employed and unemployed in technical companies, telecommunications and informatics; Signs occupational agreement for employees in technical firms.</td>
<td>Union factions: PAME, Left Schema, Aftonomi Paremvasi, Enosi Ergazomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Hellenic Trade Union of TIM (WIND) Employees (PASE-TIM)</td>
<td>Represents employees in TIM(WIND) company; Signs firm level agreement; Affiliated with Federation of Private Sector Employees (OIYE)</td>
<td>No political factionalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan-Hellenic Trade Union of Vodafone Employees (PASE-Vodafone)</td>
<td>Represents employees in Vodafone company; Signs firm level agreement. Not affiliated with secondary-level union.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union of Forthnet Employees (SEF)</td>
<td>Represents employees in Forthnet company; Does not sign firm level agreement.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union of Employees in OTE Call Centres (SETK-OTE)</td>
<td>Represents fixed-term contract and part-time employees in OTE Call Centres, Not affiliated with OME-OTE.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Union of Workers in Telecoms and Informatics (SETIP)</td>
<td>Represents employees in telecommunications and informatics companies in Attica. Affiliate-member of PAME.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Own Elaboration.

4) The Representation of Business: "Narrow interests" Trade Associations and the Lack of Employer Associability

The first business association in the broader telecoms sector was SEPE (Federation of Hellenic Information Technology & Communications Enterprises). SEPE was established in 1995, but the main aims of the association were not concentrated in representing business interests in the labour relations realm. Instead, the aim was to
focus on the technological and regulatory aspects of the market. In addition to that, the firms that constituted the founding members were almost exclusively coming from the information technology sector, which was thriving in the mid-1990s. Mobile telecommunications companies (Vodafone, WIND) were making their first steps at the time. By the early 2000s, OTE and the large fixed and mobile telephony companies became members of this association. Despite the enlargement of membership to include telecommunications companies, the logic of interest representation that was enshrined in the association’s statute remained narrow, focused on lobbying for regulatory and technological issues. The next section will document in more detail the only case when the association faced a rather weak challenge to engage with labour relations issues.

The full opening up of fixed-telephony market and the entry of new players triggered the creation of new interest groups. The second instance in the sector is SATPE (Greek Licensed Telecommunication Providers Association), which was established in 2003. This association was the initiative of the smaller telecoms operators, which were given licences to offer fixed-telephony services over OTE’s last mile of the network. The association’s main function was to represent the interests of its members in the implementation of European Union regulation with regard to liberalisation and acted mainly as a lobbying group vis-à-vis the national regulator.26

Although SATPE started with very dynamic and promising companies, the Greek market proved to be very competitive for some of those firms. Several of this association’s founding members were forced to go out of business (e.g. Lannet and Teledome) by the end of the 2000s.27 The business strategy of the new firms was very much focused on low cost products and services, rather than product diversification. Although new subscribers’ base was expanding rapidly, the "cash-flow" problems pushed many firms out of the market.28 In the late 2000s other smaller providers merged (e.g. Vivodi with OnTelecoms) or made strategic alliances with larger firms (e.g. "Hellas On Line" with Vodafone) so that they survive competition.29 These developments cumulatively contributed to the weakening of the clout of the aforementioned association.
Finally, EEKT (*Association of Mobile Telephony Companies*) was established in 2008. This association had only three members (Cosmote, Vodafone, and WIND), all of which operated in the mobile telephony market. The rationale behind its creation was to influence regulatory issues, and not surprisingly, the life of the association was foreseen to last until September 2011. This short-timeframe was not random; 2011-2012 was the period when the earlier mobile frequencies licenses were expected to expire; and the independent regulator (EETT) intended to conduct an open tender procedure for the award of spectrum usage rights. This explains the very narrow range of interest, on which the association was based: lobbying the independent regulator procurement process.

### Table 7: Main Business Associations in the Greek Telecoms Sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Function/Affiliation</th>
<th>Membership/Structure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federation of Hellenic Information Technology &amp;</td>
<td>Represents information and communications technology enterprises; Affiliate member of European Industry Association for Information Systems, Communication Technologies &amp; Consumer Electronics (DIGITALEUROPE).</td>
<td>18 alternative telecoms providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Enterprises (SEPE) Est. 1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Licensed Telecommunication Providers Association</td>
<td>Represents Greek electronic communications providers; Main function is to promote the regulatory framework in telecommunications in fair competition. Affiliate member of European Telecoms Association (ECTA)</td>
<td>350 informatics and telecoms firms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(SATPE) Est. 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Mobile Phone Companies (EEKT) Est. 2008</td>
<td>Represents Greek mobile phone companies</td>
<td>3 firms (Cosmote, Vodafone and Wind)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Author’s Own Elaboration.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above discussion suggests that an employer association with legal competence to negotiate agreements was entirely missing in the Greek telecoms case. Even more it shows that business representation was segmented along many lines: SEPE represented info-tech companies and big telecoms providers; SATPE represented smaller telecoms providers; and EEKT represented only mobile telephony companies.
Thus, the prospect of having an association able to mediate effectively the interests of both small and large firms was unlikely. All associations were oriented towards representing "narrow interests" regarding regulation, acting as mere trade associations. Overall, the lack of employer associability foreshadowed the slim chances of success for the attempt to centralise bargaining in the sector.

5) Greek Telecosms in the late 2000s: The Failure of Centralisation

So far the paper reviewed the processes of liberalisation and privatisation in the market that brought about the intensification of competition. It was highlighted how unions were unable to speak with a single voice and the larger OTE union erected barriers to a unitary representation of labour interests. Additionally, it was shown that employer associability was missing, and business associations were oriented towards representing narrow interests, divided between larger and smaller firms. This section will show how and why these divisions played out in the attempt to centralise bargaining across the sector.

OME-OTE was clearly the stronger trade union capable of leading any attempt at bargaining centralisation. However, bargaining centralisation was very low in the agenda of OME-OTE, which was very much focused on the negotiation of its internal restructuring. On 2 February 2006, the Executive Council of OME-OTE met and decided the bargaining platform for the start of negotiations for a new company agreement, including no less than 56 items.30 The items were of various types: generic demands (e.g. reform of the Greek tax system, fewer indirect taxes), demands pertaining to the operation of the independent regulator EETT (e.g. relaxation of tariff restrictions to OTE); company-union issues (union representatives to get back the right to be represented at the board of directors of OTE); resistance to further privatisation; request for funding from OTE for training programmes for trade unionists; and other non-wage issues such as benefits and holidays. Crucially, it was the first time that their platform included the demand to centralise bargaining with an industry-wide agreement covering all firms in the sector. However, the item was very low in the priorities of the unions. OME-OTE was not resolved to push for the centralisation of bargaining and this is evidenced in two ways.
Indeed, the only attempt to centralise bargaining in the sector came from the small occupational union of engineers’ (SMT) in 2008. Contrary to OME-OTE, SMT was resolved to push for bargaining centralisation. This time there were prior consultations with representatives from firm level unions in the sector (Wind, Forthnet, and Vodafone) and individual employees (Altec Telecoms, etc). Additionally, SMT carried out a brief study to support the demand for a sectoral agreement, and then sent the invitation to SEPE, which was one of the two business associations in the sector. SEPE responded with a rejection of this demand. When the request for a sectoral contract went to the Organisation for Mediation and Arbitration and SEPE was invited to the negotiations, SEPE argued that it lacked of legal competence to negotiate labour relations issues on behalf of its members and the mediation process ended there.

But apart from the lack of legal competence, a number of other factors hindered this effort. First of all, the union made one tactical error and several strategic ones. The tactical error lied on the fact that on its request for sectoral agreement, it asked for wage levels that surpassed by far those in firm level agreements provided in WIND. The trade unionists in SMT were not interested in setting lowest common standards in the sector. In other words, SMT unionists were maximalist in their demands, and this meant that the chances for success were even slimmer. But perhaps more important were the strategic miscalculations that the union made.

The unions’ side appeared unable to speak with a single voice. SMT lacked the requisite size to put pressure to employers via a national strike. Instead, they only organised a small demonstration outside the SEPE association’s offices. Finally, SMT lacked the support of OME-OTE. The latter was the largest union in the sector and had established links with both political parties. By contrast, SMT was a negligible player which had no links to with either centre-right or centre-left political parties. SMT’s members followed a leftist-leaning political orientation and were representing mainly employees with spurious self-employment (blokaki). SMT’s relations with the peak confederation GSEE were not good either, since they considered GSEE as "sold out" (poulimenoi) and part of "employer-controlled
unionism” *(ergodotikos syndikalismos)*.37 This deprived SMT from the political links that would have facilitated the use of state’s coercive powers. Indeed, the request for centralisation of wage bargaining in telecoms was announced to the Ministry of Labour, but the Minister showed no interest.

### V. Discussion and Conclusion

The empirical part of the paper focused on the structure of interest representation in the Greek telecoms sector. On the business side, there was a proliferation of narrow interests associations. They lacked the crucial legal competence to represent their members in labour relations and were solely focused on representing them on regulatory issues. The divisions among them were stark: one association for large telecom providers, a second association for small alternative telecom operators, and a third association just for mobile telephony companies.

On the labour side, the unions in the sector appeared divided along several lines. Unions in the incumbent operator (OTE) were very much focused on negotiating their internal restructuring. Moreover, the centralisation demand was led by a small occupational union, which was leftist in political orientation, and lacked the precious links with centre-right or socialist parties. The government was uninterested in taking into account the demand for centralisation that came from that union, with no clear electoral gain. Instead, it sought to make exchange with the union in the incumbent OTE, so that its agenda for privatisation proceeds.

Overall, the possibility of exchanging centralisation of bargaining for "negotiated flexibility" as in the Italian case of telecommunications (see Kornelakis, 2012) was and remains unlikely. OME-OTE response to the market liberalisation was first to contain it via lobbying the independent regulator, and second to negotiate an extremely generous compensation from the state. Unless unions are able to overcome internal divisions, the decentralised bargaining structure will likely persist in the future.
The argument put forward here is relevant to wider debates in comparative political economy and the dynamics of change within models of capitalism. Conventionally, Greece is classified a Mediterranean model of capitalism or a "Mixed Market Economy" model (Molina & Rhodes, 2007; Schmidt, 2008). The paper inquired how the pressures for liberalisation of the "incoherent" Mediterranean model of capitalism might play out. For instance, in Coordinated Market Economies domestic actors have mediated the European regulatory impact, "re-regulating the single market" via associational governance (Menz, 2003, 2005). Based on this case study, this insight does not hold in the less "coherent" model of Mediterranean capitalism, which lacks the crucial "institutional complementarities". The labour actors in the Greek telecoms case did not accept the European Union’s liberalisation agenda and devoted their resources to resist privatisation and delay the opening up of the telecommunications market. Paradoxically, their strategies backfired on them, since they accelerated the faster convergence to Anglo-Saxon "cut-throat competition" conditions, with an unprecedented expansion of precarious and flexible contracts.

Does this mean that the liberalisation shift may be questioned in those sectors? Not quite. The EU liberalisation was implemented in the Greek telecoms case, even if delayed. However, this change in the regulatory framework in the "product market" had unintended consequences. These findings concur with other works in the literature (Thatcher, 2007b) that find that the institutional convergence in regulatory frameworks, does not necessarily lead to convergence in outcomes. Due to the lack of associational governance of the labour market, there was no floor on wage costs. Hence, the firms adopted a price-based competition strategy. The resultant "cut-throat" competition pushed many alternative telephony operators out of the market by the end of the 2000s. As a result, a more oligopolistic product market emerged and this undermined the intentions of the liberalisation in the first place.
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Notes


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16 Its affiliate members include: PET-OTE (Pan-Hellenic Union of OTE Technicians), PASE-OTE (Pan-Hellenic Association of OTE Employees), EETE-OTE (Union of OTE Tertiary Education Employees), SE-Cosmote (Association of Cosmote Employees), PSR-OTE (Pan-Hellenic Association of OTE Radiotelegraph Operators), and PSEP-OTE (Pan-Hellenic Association of OTE Informatics Employees).

17 For instance, several employees in OTE were recruited for job descriptions requiring a minimum of secondary education, whereas in fact they were overqualified and possessed graduate and/or post-graduate degrees. The primary union for employees with higher education requested repeatedly the recognition of those employees’ acquired skills, and by implication, their upgrading into a higher job classification and pay scale. On the other hand, the primary union for employees with secondary education was against such a change, requiring those employees to be paid according to the job description for which they were recruited.

19 Author’s interviews with industrial relations expert 2 (11 February 2010) and with sectoral labour representative 11 (27 April 2011).


21 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 13 (2 May 2011).

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35 Author’s interview with sectoral labour representative 13 (2 May 2011).

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