ADAPTATION?
TRANSFORMATION? BOTH? NEITHER?
THE MANY FACES OF GOVERNANCE

Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.
University of Texas at Austin
P.O. Box Y
Austin, TX 78713-8925
USA
T: +1 512 232 8353
E: llynnjr@gmail.com

Jerusalem Forum
on Regulation & Governance
The Hebrew University
Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905, Israel
regulation@mscc.huji.ac.il
http://regulation.huji.ac.il

Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.

Abstract: Unlike coinages, such as “new public management” and “reinventing government”, that become terms of art in public administration, the term “governance” has for centuries meant “a system of ordered rule”, applicable in both public and private sectors. This paper is concerned with three categories of meanings, popular in professional discourse, which go beyond the generic: (1) governance as synonymous with “government” and its role in societal steering; (2) governance as synonymous with “good government” or “effective governing” in the public sphere; and (3) governance as an emerging model of societal steering that lies “beyond government” in that it involves both an enlarged role for civil society institutions and greater reliance on deliberative, as opposed to representative, democracy, arguably constituting a new paradigm of governance. After sorting through the various meanings and issues associated with each, the paper concludes by arguing that a diverse body of evidence suggests that institutional evolution in both the developed and developing worlds is moving along many different pathways whose further illumination is essential.

Key words: Governance, Governance indicators, Institutional change, “New governance”, Public administration.

Introduction

As with many recently fashionable constructs in public administration – “new public management” and “reinventing government” come to mind – “new (public) governance” – hereafter simply “governance” - has been following a predictable evolution. From early formulations of the idea, definitions and applications have proliferated to the point that the idea has becomes shapeless, a portmanteau accommodating numerous meanings that are often imprecise, inconsistent, or contradictory.

Unlike coinages that become terms of art, however, governance has for centuries been a descriptive term for “systems of ordered rule”. To paraphrase the *Oxford English Dictionary*, governance is the action or manner of governing, that is, of directing, guiding, or regulating individuals, organizations, nations, or multi-national associations in conduct or actions. In scholarly usage, governance has been defined simply as “the general exercise of authority” (Michalski, Miller, and Stevens 2001, 9), where authority refers to institutions for control and accountability.

Thus we may describe the governance of the European Union and the World Health Organization, of the People’s Republic of China and the Federative Republic of Brazil, of AIDS/HIV prevention and treatment efforts globally and in particular states and communities, of individual business corporations, non-governmental organizations, and public agencies, of both formal and informal networks and consociations of actors, of international agreements to regulate fisheries and other common-pool resources, of the Roman Catholic Church, of non-state entities such as al-Qaeda and Opus Dei, and of activities covered by international treaties or conventions such as the control of nuclear non-proliferation, smoking, or trade in agricultural products. When organizations, policies, nations, or agreements fail, we often cite problems of governance as a cause.
This paper is concerned with three categories of meanings which go beyond the descriptive and are popular in the contemporary discourse on governance. These meanings reflect increased scholarly and policy maker attention to two forces which are shaping the evolution of institutions worldwide and are often in tension with each other: the globalization of economic activity, which arguably tends toward strengthening the role governments, and the democratization of politics, which arguably tends toward strengthening the role of civil society institutions.

The three categories of meanings considered below are: (1) governance as synonymous with government and its role in societal steering; (2) governance as synonymous with “good government” or “effective governing” in the public sphere; and (3) governance as an emerging model of societal steering “beyond government” which involves both an expanding role for civil society institutions in directing and regulating the uses of public resources and greater reliance on deliberative, as opposed to representative, forms of democracy. This third category in particular has begotten narratives of transformation suggesting a clearly emergent trend toward a new paradigm of societal steering, in developed democracies.

Three issues arise in the analysis of governance however defined. First, each category of meanings implies normative claims, that is, claims that governance is properly understood as government’s role, or as implying criteria of public sector effectiveness, or as focusing on the changing boundaries between states and civil societies. Related to this is a second issue: meanings appropriate to understanding institutional evolution in fully-developed democracies are likely to be inappropriate for understanding governance in young, immature democracies and in nations struggling with or still emerging from autocratic rule and having only rudimentary democratic elements. Thus governance in sub-Saharan Africa and in the states of the former Soviet Union may mean something different than governance in the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Finally, the empirical foundations of different meanings of governance are often weak, comprising cases and examples chosen to support normative claims rather than hypothesis-based investigations designed to test such claims.

This paper will sort through the various meanings and issues associated with the study and practice of governance toward the objective of formulating responses to two
questions: Is there sufficient evidence to warrant claims of transformation? What do we know about how governance is evolving in nations of the developed and developing worlds? Evidence of different kinds (discussed below) supports narratives of adaptation and transformation. But, Pollitt and Bouckaert note, “the crucial evidence is the growth of a new community of discourse” (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 137); transformation is occurring because a growing number of responsible experts say it is. Readers are forewarned, therefore, that this paper is a skeptic’s brief, an argument that a diverse body of evidence suggests that institutional evolution is moving along many different pathways whose further illumination is essential.

The analysis proceeds as follows. The next section briefly discusses the three categorical meanings of governance mentioned above, including why each is controversial. There follows a consideration of various types of evidence that suggest on what we are learning about the evolution of governance. Next, a graphic heuristic is presented which depicts various characterizations and trajectories of change in governing institutions and practices, thus depicting the many faces of governance. The paper concludes by answering the questions posed above and offering ideas concerning the kinds of empirical research that will move the discussion of governance onto firmer empirical foundations.

**What Does “Governance” Mean?**

What follows is a compressed summary of the three categories of meanings mentioned above.

**Governance as Government**

As human communities, by force or choice, came under formally institutionalized forms of direction, governance came to be associated with government (as it still is in contemporary dictionaries. As the World Bank has defined it, governance is “the
exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affairs” (World Bank 1989, 60; cf. Stoker 1998).

Governance, then, can refer to the role of the state: to institutions established to secure the rule of law. In supranational contexts such as the European Union or United Nations conventions, “[g]overnance is a system of rules, norms, and institutions that govern public and private behavior across national boundaries’ (United Nations 1995), and it occurs at different levels within the international system (Krahman 2003). Thus governance may refer to “shared sovereignty” arrangements, which arise some of the (Westphalian) sovereignty of individual states is ceded to supranational entities that govern agreed-upon activities of member states.

Equating governance with government is criticized by those who perceive a clear trend away from government as the dominant institution in societal steering toward a greater role of civil society institutions, such as NGOs, foundations, networks controlled by civil society actors, and various forms of self-regulation (Hajer and Wageman 2003, Sorenson 2006).

**Governance as “Good Government”**

As multi-national and international organizations, as well as individual donor countries, began assisting newly independent and newly emerging nations to address economic, social, and administrative issues of increasing complexity, governance gradually came to be used in the sense of “good government” or “effective governing”. The assumption underlying this meaning is that donor aid allocations are likely to be most effective in promoting economic and social development where there is good governance modeled on the successful governments of the developed world.

Meanings in this category vary in scope. The United Nations Economic and Social Commission on Asia and the Pacific proclaimed that “good governance has eight major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive, and follows the rule of
law” (quoted by Löffler 2009, 217). In contrast, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Democracy and Governance Assessment Framework, “governance” is distinguished from “elections and political processes”, “civil society”, and “rule of law”, and is defined as pertaining to “the ability of government to develop an efficient and effective public management process” (USAID 2008, 40); thus good governance is synonymous with good public management. The World Bank continues to view government as the principal locus of authority and its effectiveness and lawfulness as essential to good societal steering. Governance means “the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services’ (The World Bank 2007, 1).

This category of meanings has drawn criticism of three kinds. Andrews (2010) argues that “the good governance version of good or effective government is a hollow one imposing a false one-best-way model on developing countries” (7-8). Based on his analysis of public financial management structures in 38 national governments, Andrews finds that “governments we would comfortably call good or effective (1) are not more likely to exhibit these characteristics [of ideal governance] than other governments and (2) have highly varying characteristics” (8). Lowenheim argues that, although they can promote democracy and human rights, the criteria of good government incorporated in aggregate Indicators “are not merely a service to governments nor simply advisories that states a re free to accept or reject. These systems of evaluations are embedded in relations of power and domination, and examined states cannot rebuff the practice without risking certain costs” (Lowenheim 2008, 271). Aggregate indicators based on perceptual measures are criticized on a variety of technical grounds, discussed further below.

**Governance as Beyond Government**

Regarding the previous two categories of meanings as unduly narrow, scholars began disassociating the term “governance” from its historical association with government. They sought to characterize the divestment of state-owned enterprises, the decentralization and devolution of governmental authority, phenomena such as
hybridization and joined-up government, and emerging partnerships with civil society institutions. Said Boyer (1990, 51): “Clearly, we are moving beyond governments to governance,” which he defined as the “action of government plus its interaction with its nongovernmental partners in the process of governing—in their collective relationship with the economy and public policy.”

The bolder notion of “governance without government” was coined to refer to a belief, expressed first by British and Dutch scholars, that new international, national, and local policy challenges are transforming the nature of politics, the instruments of collective action, and the practice of administration. Powerful stakeholders and ordinary citizens are, it is argued, demanding larger roles in the exercise of public authority. In general, say Hajer and Wagenaar (2003, 2: quoted by Hysing 2009, 647), “The language of ‘governance’ seems to help practitioners and theorists alike to unlearn embedded intellectual reflexes and break out of tacit patterns of thinking. This stimulates them to rethink governing.”

Several different meanings of this non-government-centric concept of governance are now found in the literature.

- Governance may refer to a particular model of governing that *coexists with* government. As one scholar puts it, “the very essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which *do not rest* on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2005, 17).

- In a variation on this definition, a the term “governance” refers to government’s “relationships with other actors and the process of handling complex decisions and implementation processes”, that is, to governance *networks* as opposed to government bureaucracies” (Klijn 2009, pp. 510-511).

- In the boldest of the new definitions of governance, governance to encapsulates “the changing form and role of the state in advanced industrial societies,” especially focusing on public sector reform and on “the changing boundary between state and civil society” (Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003, 13).
The latter meaning has produced various narratives of transformation whereby, it is claimed, post-traditional democracies are converging on a new paradigm of societal steering that de-bureaucratizes and decentralizes authority over resource allocation and public service delivery. Indeed, if international organizations, especially of aid donors, have emphasized the promotion of effective government, scholars have been much taken with the prospective replacement of so-called traditional, bureaucratic public administration by a new public governance that features plurality, interdependence, and trust.

This category of meanings, especially narratives of transformation, has provoked a critical literature that questions the declining role of the state (Lynn 2010). Public bureaucracies, they argue, remain essential to the effective functioning of representative democracy. Bureaucratic institutions, even in Weber’s account, are adaptable to change and context. Changes in the mechanisms of governance, they insist, extend and elaborate but do not replace traditional principles of democratic delegation and control. So long as public policies depend on authority and resources provided through representative institutions, hierarchically-ordered administration structures reflecting the rule of law will remain at the heart of liberal representative governance.

**Varieties of Evidence**

The growing emphasis on governance has attracted the interest of researchers in the academy, think tanks, and international organizations. The resulting literatures include various types of evidence reflecting the different meanings of governance and interests of investigators. The findings discussed in this section have been selected to show that meta-narratives of transformation and convergence must yield to a more complex and nuanced view of how the institutions of governance are evolving.
Research Based on Aggregate Indicators

The promotion of good government has led to the proliferation of aggregate indicators that rank or assess countries according to measures that are often based on expert assessments and responses to surveys, less often on “hard” or objective data (Bandura 2008). Following are three examples.

The most comprehensive project is the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database now covering 212 countries and territories from 1998 to 2008 and measuring three dimensions of governance defined as “the exercise of authority through formal and informal traditions and institutions for the common good (Kaufmann 2003). The three dimensions are (1) the process of selecting, monitoring, and replacing governments; (2) the capacity to formulate and implement sound policies and deliver public services, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

In a summary analysis of trends in governance during the period 1998 to 2008, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009, 23) conclude that “there is little evidence of significant (or quantitatively important) changes in world averages of governance over the past decade” (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 23). For advanced liberal democracies such as the US, UK, the Netherlands, and Germany, there was no significant change in the six aggregate indicators and even some selective deterioration between 1996 and 2008.

First published by the Bertelsmann Siftung Foundation in 2003, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index now ranks countries ranging from failed states to those approaching mature economic and political development. Two indicators are published: the Status Index explores “the state of development achieved by 128 countries on their way to democracy under the rule of law and a market economy flanked by sociopolitical safeguards”; the Management Index focuses on “the steering and management of development and transformation processes” (Bertelsmann Siftung 2010).

More specifically, the Foundation claims that “the Management Index evaluates the governance capability of political decision-makers while taking into consideration the
level of difficulty [facing these decision makers]. Its overall result is calculated by multiplying the intermediate result with a factor derived from the level of difficulty evaluation”. The intermediate result is the mean value of the ratings for steering capability, resource efficiency, consensus building, and international cooperation. “The level of difficulty evaluation takes into account the structural constraints on political management. It is obtained by calculating six indicators that evaluate a country’s structural conditions, traditions of civil society, intensity of conflicts, level of education, economic performance and institutional capacity.”

Finally, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) publishes its Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) for 75 countries eligible for IDA assistance. The Bank believes that better government improves development outcomes, including poverty reduction, and uses the IRAI rankings as a basis for concessional assistance awards. One of the four clusters of criteria included in the aggregate index covers public sector management and institutions, which comprises measures of property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization, quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector. Measures are based on assessments by the IDA staff.

As noted earlier, aggregate cross-country indicators, especially those based on perceptual measures, are controversial. Critics argue that the data are of poor quality, subject as they are to measurement error, non-transparency, and arbitrary scaling and that, as a result, “the oft-asserted connection between growth and governance lies on exceedingly shaky empirical pilings” (Berkman et al 2008, Kurtz and Shrank 2007, 552). In rebuttal, others argue that softer measurements of institutions “tend to capture more subjective features of the outcome of institutional design and implementation, such as the level of judicial independence, the capacity of institutions such as the legislature or the bureaucracy, or the institutionalization of political parties” (Berkman et al 2008, 21) and that the effort to create such indicators represents a meaningful scientific advance toward identifying correlates of economic development.

The important point is that the ideas concerning what constitutes “good governance”, ideas that are largely government-centric, are undoubtedly influential in shaping the
institutional evolution of countries in varying stages of economic, political, and social development. The general impression created by aggregate indicator research is that institutional change is multi-dimensional, incremental, and multi-directional across countries.

Assessments of Institutional Change and Reform

The recent popularity of governance reforms in the development democracies has motivated a variety of synoptic investigations into their consequences. Three are of particular interest: research studies by the OECD, assessment of reforms associated with NPM and Reinventing Government, and research on issues associated with the continuing evolution of the European Union.

OECD Studies

The OECD conducts comparative analyses of governance in member countries that draw broad conclusions concerning institutional change. Their reports have indeed identified a transformation in governance, but in the opposite direction than the popular narratives: toward what is called “the regulatory state”.

One such analysis concluded, for example, that

[a]cross the OECD area, the liberalisation of domestic markets and international trade, coupled with the introduction of regulatory management tools, has led to a profound reformulation of the state’s role in the economy. Scholars have labeled this trend the ‘rise of the regulatory state’. . . . A vital factor behind this change has been the creation of a host of new institutions – oversight bodies, regulatory agencies, administrative courts and ombudsman commissions – to manage newly liberalized markets. These specialised agencies have developed a host of tools to develop evidenced-based policies and to enforce economic regulations” (OECD 2009a, italics added).
A related OECD study addressed issues raised by the rise of the regulatory state. An assessment of barriers to administrative simplification notes that “[g]overnments are facing increasing and changing challenges and, in response, regulatory activities multiply red tape” (OECD 2009b, 6).

According to yet another OECD study, countries’ are relying increasingly on “agencies, authorities, and other autonomous bodies” (OECD 2002). The report concludes that “[i]n public law, awarding the status of legal person does not usually affect the political responsibility or accountability of the minister for the activities of such a body” (10, italics added). However, these autonomous organizations “should be subsidiary bodies that belong to government ministerial departments but benefit from some managerial flexibility” (10, italics added).

The general conclusion of this research might well have been provided by Kooiman (2003, 13), a progenitor of the governance-as-networks perspective, who concedes that “the state is still very much alive. Although new modes of government [such as subsidiary bodies], with the state as a participant, are “on the agenda”, he says, “the state is perfectly capable of giving with one hand [managerial flexibility] and taking with the other [ministerial-level regulation].”

Research on Managerialist Reforms

Research on managerialist reforms such as NPM reveals similar contradictions between claims of transformation and reality.

The accomplishments of the Clinton Administration’s National Performance Review and its implementation as “reinventing government” was investigated by Thompson (2000. He notes that “NPR incorporates a diverse set of interventions directed toward the achievement of multiple objectives” (509), which he summarized and classified as, of tier importance: downsizing, reducing administrative costs, and reforming administrative systems; of second order importance: decentralizing authority within agencies, empowering front-line workers and promoting cultural change in agencies; and of the third tier importance: improving the quality of public services and
improving the efficiency of agency work procedures. Based on surveys conducted by a US government personnel agency, Thompson concluded that, while some success has been achieved with regard to lower, first-order goals (such as downsizing) only limited progress has been made toward critical, higher, second- and third-order reinvention objectives (such as ―significant, systemic improvement in quality of services or culture‖ (Thompson 2000, 510). In a similar vein, Pollitt (2000, 194) notes that ―cases where there is unmistakable evidence of management reform producing more effective government action are rare‖ (2000, 194).

Mixed results were also the finding of a study of the New Steering Model, a NPM-style reform in German local government (Kuhlmann, Bogumil, and Grohs 2008, 860). The authors conclude that “[a] comprehensive ‘paradigm shift’ from the Weberian bureaucracy to a managerial NSM administration has not occurred. Many local authorities tend to implement new structures and instruments only formally, without using them in a “managerial” way. Rather, they seek to make these instruments fit into the traditional bureaucracy. Public administrations in Continental Europe still have no solution how to make managerialism match with their prevailing legalist ‘rule of law’ culture.”

Of particular interest in reform-oriented research is the analysis of governance reforms in Anglophone and European states by Bevir, Rhodes and Weller (2003). They ask: “What is the plot of our story?” Their complex plot comprises twelve points. Notable among them is the following: “[T]he beliefs and practices of elite actors [engaged in reform] originate in the traditions they have inherited. They construct issues or dilemmas out of experiences infused with these traditions” (202). “Governance is constructed differently and continuously reconstructed so there can be no one set of tools” (203).

Although this conclusion, applying as it does to developed countries, somewhat contradicts the more formulaic ideas incorporated into aggregate indicators for developing countries, the implications are similar: countries tend to go their own way based on context-and tradition-driven approaches to institutional development.
The evolution of the European into a supranational governing entity provides a notable narrative of institutional transformation among member countries with elements both of transformation and adaptation, hierarchy and cooperation.

It is a story of increased hierarchical governance. Jordan, Wurzel and Zito, for example, conclude that “the EU is now the dominant influence on national environmental policy through issuing regulations that are incorporated into national law.” Hysing concludes that “The responsibility for standardization and regulation of environmental impact originating from transport has largely been delegated to the EU level” (666).

But hierarchy is not the whole story. Mamudu and Studlar (2009) examine the emergence of a complex, multi-level governance institution concerning the control of tobacco use within the European Union involving the concept of shared sovereignty, which “deals with how states willingly cede part of their sovereignty to intergovernmental organizations or supranational bodies to deal with issues that cannot be handled singlehandedly.” However, when scope of sovereignty covers specific issue areas, state authority is disaggregated nongovernmental organizations, judges, commissions, and interest groups. In tobacco control, for example, nonstate entities have become prominent within this system of multilevel governance. Thus multilevel governance in the EU has provided new opportunities for interest groups, especially those frustrated at the state level, to bring their arguments to a new level, one with fewer established insider–outsider power relationships.

The emergence of accountability networks in the European Union has been investigated by Harlow and Rawlings (2006). They rely on Bovens definition of accountability: (1) giving an account; (2) debating the issues; (3) evaluation or passing judgment. It is “public” [external, not internal], excludes institutional, managerial, hierarchical accountability.” Thus accountability is essentially retrospective and can, but need not, include an element of sanction. As examples of accountability networks, they cite the EU’s court system, which can sanction Member States, the Association of Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions (ASC), which is composed of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
Councils of State or the Supreme administrative jurisdictions of each of the Member States and maintains two vital databases; the Conference of European Constitutional Courts; and the Office of the European Ombudsman (EO), which lacked an element of sanction.

Thus the evolution of the EU has engendered a complex network of relationships linking public and private actors and might be regarded as a prototype of “balanced governance”.

**Evidence from Theory-Based Empirical Research**

Scholars have investigated particular propositions, conjectures, and hypotheses related to the evolution of governing institutions involving a wide array of issues. Following are examples of such studies which cast a nuanced light on some familiar themes in transformist narratives.

**Networks**

Networks are an especially popular subject of empirical research. Considine and Lewis (2003, 132), for example, “[sought to turn the vague reform rhetoric of various countries at the leading edge of change [Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, and New Zealand] into testable propositions about the way real officials should work in the new systems.” A sample of over one thousand individuals engaged in governance in the four countries was surveyed concerning “two sequential propositions: (1) the strength of commitment to the traditional bureaucratic or procedural model of governance; and (2) the strength of . . . new models of governance” (133). The authors concluded that “enterprise governance”—that is, NPM-style governance—and network modes of governance “now operate as norms in practice, in addition to the older form of bureaucratic or procedural organization, in reform-minded countries” (138, italics
Networks, the authors conclude, are “a meaningful concept” in administrative practice” in the study countries (138).

Networks of equals are not the panacea many claim them to be, however. A series of studies of mental health networks by Milward and Provan (2000), found that those networks that develop long term relationships that mimic the stability of bureaucracy actually perform better than those that remain more fluid. In a related vein, O’Toole and Meier (2004), in their studies of network relationships within and among school districts, found that “stability of personnel and management, both traits more associated with bureaucracy than networks, were strongly and positively correlated with higher performance on a wide variety of organizational outputs and outcomes.” In summary, networks may, in Meier and Hill’s view (62), “be more effective to the degree they take on bureaucratic traits.” Eikenberry (2007, 194) says that many scholars “show that networks can exacerbate rather than alleviate inequality in the political process.” Similarly Rouban (1999, 2) notes, based on several investigations, that “networks are not necessarily democratic and more often create communities than they do citizens. . . [D]ecentralization procedures have not always led to more local democracy” but may strengthen local elites.

In summary, collaboration among network participants may obscure both formal and informal governance arrangements or understandings that reflect or create power differentials and hierarchy and that can either strengthen or weaken the collaboration.

Engaging Citizens

Studies of direct democracy and citizen participation reveal numerous contradictions between the claimed salutary effects of citizen engagement and the reality of local elite domination of deliberative processes and citizen bias (Lynn 2002). One study of how well community service organizations meet community needs concluded: “From a broader policy standpoint, our findings question the ability of community service organizations to identify and respond to community needs” (Markham, Johnson and Bonjean 1999, 176). A survey of research on neighborhood-representing organizations found “a low level of both participatory and representative democracy”
in such organizations (Cnaan 1991, 629). Finally, winners and losers in political contests express different levels of satisfaction with democratic institutions, winners preferring majoritarian government, losers preferring consensual processes (Anderson and Guillory 1997).

Citizen engagement is also affected by technological advances. According to Dunleavy and his colleagues (Dunleavy et al., 2006), revolutionary advances in information technology have brought about ‘changes in management systems and in methods of interacting with citizens and other service-users in civil society in the underpinning and integrating of current bureaucratic adaptations’ whose effects are felt ‘via a wide range of cognitive, behavioral, organizational, political, and cultural changes that are linked to information systems, broadly construed’ (Dunleavy et al., 2006: 468). Is this an unalloyed good thing?

One such development, however, digital identity management (IDM) may change the relationship between citizens and the state, but, argue Lips, Taylor and Organ (2009) it is as yet unclear as to whether it will be toward a “service state” (services integration/joined-up government) or a “surveillance state”. The reason for the current lack of clarity in this regard is that management use of digitized information appears to be lagging, which is inhibiting the emergence of either type of state. Thus, they conclude, the argument that digital IDM will make IDM faster, easier, cheaper is simplistic and misses the main issues.

In summary, findings concerning citizen involvement in governance are widely varying and highly qualified by contextual factors. Findings range from benefits such as “social learning”, better agency-public relations, and better alignment of agency and citizen interests to costs such as increased divisiveness, the displacement of reason by passion and persistence, and heightened distrust of and respect for public officials. Empirical research does not support a presumption that the pursuit of self-interest will yield to shared understandings and the accommodation of differences. Indeed, the opposite may be the result.
The Emergence of “New Governance”

Two studies of environmental policy making present findings that qualify the beyond-government-to-governance narrative.

In their study, “The Rise of New Policy Instruments”, Jordan, Wurzel and Zito (2005) note that the very “essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” (quoting Stoker 1998, 17). They investigate the adoption of what they call New Environmental Policy Instruments by eight European countries and the European Union. Their question is: Has governance, as they define it, eclipsed government? Their analytic framework postulates four types of interactions between new governance instruments and traditional government: co-existence, fusion, competition, and replacement. They found that “regulation is still the most widely used instrument of environmental policy” (489), no wholesale switch to new policy instruments, from government to governance, has occurred. Rather, new policy instruments are used for specific new tasks and coexist with traditional regulation.

In a study of Swedish forestry and transport policies, Hysing (2009) asks: “Is from government to governance a credible story line for understanding these cases?” The research is based on a review of existing research on forest and transport governing, as well as new empirical findings from policy documents (evaluations, government bills, programs, strategies, etc.) and qualitative interviews” (648). The author concludes that “The role of the state has changed during the period under study, but not in a unidirectional way. . . . The general impression . . . is that governing within both policy areas is characterized by continuity rather than dramatic changes. . . . while the state seems to be losing ground when studying one dimension, it retains or even increases its role when studying other dimensions.” (665, 667).

Although direct tests of new governance mechanisms are few, these two confirm widespread impressions that such mechanisms augment but not displace the tools of traditional government.
Multi-Level Governance

With the growing interest in governance has come similar interest in multi-level, traditionally hierarchical systems of government. C. Hill and Lynn (2005), for example, have used a multi-level “logic of governance” to evaluate over 800 published studies that explore such interactions. They found that “the vast majority of studies adopt a top-down perspective on governance . . . . Influence is modeled as flowing downward from legislation and management toward treatments and consequences” (C. Hill and Lynn 2005, 179). They conclude that “conjectures by hundreds of investigators in specialized domains [are] that the interesting questions of administration and management concern the effects of hierarchical interactions more than of horizontality” (189).

In a study that replicated the Hill and Lynn research but with published studies using non-US data, Forbes and Lynn (2005) concluded that “[e]vidence based on international data suggests, as do American studies, that different levels of governance influence one another, that is, that the organization of governance impacts what, how, and for whom public services are provided” (568). These findings have been further replicated in studies by Forbes, Hill and Lynn (2006) and by Robichau and Lynn (2009). Robichau and Lynn, following an analysis of 300 recently published research studies, concluded that “the presumption is warranted that implementation is generally hierarchical; influences flow downward through a chain of delegation to the retail level of service delivery” (24).

In one such published study, Peter May and Søren Winter (forthcoming) seek to explain the extent to which “street-level bureaucrats emphasize actions that reflect higher level policy goals” (3) in reformed Danish employment programs. The authors found that “higher level political [attention by relevant municipal politicians to employment issues] and managerial [supervision, communicating specific goals] influence the policy emphases of frontline workers” (16). In another such study, Roderick, Jacobs, and Bryk found “strong evidence that [student] achievement in promotional gate grades increased after the institution of [the Chicago public school system’s] accountability policy” (350), with the implication that hierarchically-
imposed performance standards and measures strongly affect behavior at subordinate levels of administration.

The implementation of policies and programs legitimated and financed through the exercise of public authority continue to reflect a predominantly, although necessarily imperfect, flow of influence from higher to lower levels of government and their agents in the private sector.

The Faces Of Governance

Many investigators have challenged narratives of transformation and convergence, arguing that institutional evolution across nations will take many different trajectories and reveal many different faces (Dunleavy and Hood 1994, Peters 1996, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). The kinds of evidence and arguments just summarized bear out such predictions. As Olsen argues (2006, 13), the notion infusing transformist narratives that transformation is inevitable and that it will converge on a new paradigm “is not supported by empirical observations.” In general, as the research by Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller, cited above, suggests, the evolution of governance in any country, is “path dependent”, i.e., governed in fundamental ways by beliefs and traditions unique to that country. There is “no universal process of globalization driving public sector reform” (203).

A schematic picture of some of the possible trajectories/pathways/faces of institutional evolution is shown in Figure 1, which depicts a space encompassing four governance domains: underdevelopment, governance as government, government plus governance, and governance, not government. The possibilities include:

- trajectory A, which might depict the evolution of Eastern European nations from Soviet governance into a proto-traditional “neo-Weberian states (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004), a necessary first stage on the way to more balanced governance;

- trajectory B, might depict the type of adaptation that has been occurring in many developed democracies, for example, in response to the global financial
Figure 1
Pathways of Adaptation and Transformation

GOVERNANCE AS GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT PLUS GOVERNANCE

ROLE OF GOVERNMENT

UNDER DEVELOPMENT

GOVERNANCE, NOT GOVERNMENT

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
crises that began in 2008: “the rise of the regulatory state” might be depicted by the left arrow, the general trend toward regulated devolution and third-party government in America the right arrow;

- trajectory C, which might depict the narrative of transformation put forward by those perceiving or advocating “governance without government”, for example, in Great Britain (Rhodes 1996);

- trajectory D, which might depict a typical development path taken by countries emerging from tribal or other forms of local rule toward a functioning central government;

- trajectory E, which might depict the path taken by a country nearing maturity which chooses to move more directly toward government + governance, say by an aggressive federalism; and

- trajectory F, which might depict the emergence of the complex institutions governing tobacco use in the European Union or the path taken by Great Britain during the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Trajectories might be plotted for individual countries or for similarly disposed of countries grouped on the basis of theoretical or empirical premises (cf. Rodriguez, Spink, and Ward 2008).

**Governance: A Research Agenda**

To the questions posed in the introduction to this paper - Is the evidence sufficient to warrant claims of transformation? What do we know about how governance is evolving in nations of the developed and developing worlds? – the answers are “no”, and “not nearly enough”. As Andrews (2010, 29) argues, “researchers should focus on better understanding what structures governments actually do adopt and why” (29).
Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance

What should we study? The three categories of meanings for the term “governance” have different implications for hypothesis-based research on governance. Thus we might:

● describe and compare constitutional and political institutions and their consequences, investigating, for example, whether decentralized fiscal administration leads to more efficient governance, better public goods, and higher rates of economic growth or whether political institutions shape a country’s economic policy;

● compare deliberate government reform initiatives and improvement strategies, investigating, for example, the political and policy consequences of managerialist reforms associated with New Public Management or whether major reform initiatives have changed the norms of practice among civil servants; or

● compare new public governance institutions such as networks, hybrid organizations, partnerships, and participatory decision making, investigating, for example, how the adoption of civil-society-oriented administrative technologies has modified the relationships between the authority of governments, communities, and citizens.

As the evidence surveyed in this paper attest, research of each type is ongoing, but the body of findings is thin. More of each type of investigation will more clearly reveal the different “faces” of governance and yield a richer array of insights into the nature, extent, and direction of institutional evolution in and across both the developed and developing worlds.

Even more synoptic studies of governance are needed (Heinrich, Lynn, and Milward 2010). How, for example, might changes in the boundary between the state and civil society be verified? Accompanying an authentic transformation might be, for example,

● significant reductions in the proportion of societal resources flowing through governments and thus subject to government authorization, appropriation, and administrative processes;
evidence of a pattern of devolution and deregulation of administration, such as a reduction in the number of pages of applicable regulations or instances of language changes that reassign policy and regulatory authority to non-governmental or hybrid entities;

- evidence of changes in agency enforcement strategies such as increased reliance on non-coercive, voluntary, and negotiated enforcement across significant swaths of public responsibility;

- testimony from stakeholders, such as public program administrators and their private sector agents and other civil society institutions, that government has become less intrusive, that front-line professionals are feeling more empowered and less burdened by red tape, and that local priorities have increasing weight in service delivery;

- increased interest group and citizen involvement and influence at all levels of policy making and bargaining over program features;

- redirection of political advocacy from higher to lower levels of government and from targeted political action to broader forms of social mobilization;

- greater coverage (of individuals and households) by alternative, non-traditional service delivery arrangements, evidence, that is, that more aspects of well-being for more people are in non-governmental hands; and

- reduced co-optation of the charitable nonprofit sector by government as public resources and guidance are replaced by civil society resources and direction—civil society institutions themselves—for example, foundations, fund-raising associations, and large NGOs—might be transferring authority over priorities and methods of implementation to community and grass-roots control.

Little effort has been made to assemble these kinds of evidence. Aggregate indicators, as noted above, tend to be government-centric. But there are beginnings: the data on contracting and third-party participation in service delivery collected by NGO researchers and data on contracting published by some national governments and analyzed by scholars.
One reason for the lack of effort to gather evidence is the ideological basis of reform promotions (Lynn 2010). As Olsen notes (2006, 8), “there has been little felt need to examine assumptions about the extent and consequences of administrative reform because so many reforms have been driven by strong ideological convictions or even a doctrinaire faith in what is the ideal organization and role of public administration in the economy and society.” Also, those with ideological commitments to new patterns of governance may be more interested in demonstrating how they can work. Says Eikenberry, for example, “[s]tudies on network governance have focused primarily on how to build and manage effective networks in order to improve service delivery and increase the production of public goods, not on the effects of network governance on democracy or social justice/equity issues” (Eikenberry 2007, 193; cf. O’Toole and Meier 2004a).

There can be little doubt that “governance” has become a recognized field of teaching, research, and public policy. There is a concomitant need, then, for a research enterprise that will provide it with adequate empirical foundations.
Bibliography


